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Abstract  
This paper explores some of the underpinning ideologies that drive Australia’s selective 
income support system, by examining the ethical justifications used to support targeted 
welfare systems such as Mutual Obligation. Such justifications for selectivity will be 
compared with the ethical justifications that are used to promote the concept of 
Universalism for income support, a concept that has been attracting increasing attention 
in social science circles internationally.  
 
At an ideological level, Universalism in welfare also has compelling arguments for 
implementation, particularly in the form known as the Universal Basic Income 
Guarantee or Basic Income for short. The underpinning ideologies for each income 
support system are explored so that their ethical justifications may be examined in a 
compare and contrast format. Such a format facilitates a beginning mediation between 
some of the competing ethical claims used, so as to clarify positions and develop 
greater understanding about income support system implementation debates.  
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Introduction 
This paper explores some of the underpinning ideologies that drive Australia’s selective 
income support system, by examining the ethical justifications used to support targeted 
welfare systems such as Mutual Obligation. Such justifications for selectivity will be 
compared with the ethical justifications that are used to promote the concept of 
Universalism for income support, a concept that has been attracting increasing attention 
in social science circles internationally.  
 
At an ideological level, Universalism in welfare also has compelling arguments for 
implementation, particularly in the form known as the Universal Basic Income 
Guarantee or Basic Income for short. The underpinning ideologies for each income 
support system are explored so that their ethical justifications may be examined in a 
compare and contrast format. Such a format facilitates a beginning mediation between 
some of the competing ethical claims used, so as to clarify positions and develop 
greater understanding about income support system implementation debates.  
 
 
Australia’s Categorical Social Welfare system: a selective distribution of income 
support.  
(Unemployment benefits are focused upon as the primary exemplar.) 
 
Australia currently has a coalition government that follows, according to Prime Minister 
Howard,  “a mix in public policy which combines liberalisation in economic policy and 
what I would describe as a ‘modern conservatism’ in social policy” (Howard, 1999, p.3). 
A dry economic fundamentalist welfare agenda is based on the Government’s 
perceptions of the rational individual readily responding to monetary incentives and 
disincentives, the efficiency of private enterprise and the demands of ‘globalisation’ 
(Bronson & Rousseau, 1996; Donald, 2000, Hutchings, 1998). 
 
Consequently, Australia’s categorical or targeted Social Security system increasingly 
seeks to coerce specified welfare recipients to engage in mandatory ‘activities’. These 
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activities are based upon the ideology of Mutual Obligation, which relies on a metaphor 
of giving “something [a compulsory activity] back to society in return” for benefits, 
particularly in the area of unemployment payments (Burgess, Mitchell, O’Brien, & Watts, 
1998, p.7; Howard, 1999, p.6). Mutual Obligation ideology underpins a system for 
targeting specific categories of unemployed welfare recipients, and has been popularly 
accepted as being fair and ethical. This paper examines such ethical underpinnings, 
comparing and contrasting them with the ethical underpinnings put forward by 
advocates for an unconditional Universal Basic Income as an alternative to selective 
welfare. 
 
Background to the Australian Income Support system in the context of 
unemployment 
In Australia, high unemployment levels since the mid-70’s (Watts, 2001, p. 3) gave rise 
to high numbers of people becoming long-term unemployed (Bagnall, 1999, p. 48; 
Edwards, Howard & Miller, 2001). The economic upturns in the late 1980’s and late 
1990’s were not enough to restore the unemployment level, the best achieved was “5.4 
per cent in November 1989” (Borland, 2000, p.1).  
 
Minister Newman reported 722,000 people received unemployment benefits in the year 
2000, with 457,000 of those people (63 per cent) “having received benefits for longer 
than one year” (Newman, 2000, p. 9). Burgess et al. (1998) reported Australian  
“average duration of unemployment rose from three weeks in 1966…to 50.5 weeks in 
1998”, while the long-term unemployment (defined as one year or longer) share of total 
unemployment has increased over the past twenty five years from “12.3 per cent in 
1978” (p.3) to the 63% identified above.  
 
Noting that the economy had improved and unemployment had reduced, Quiggin (2001) 
argued that the “problem is a simple shortage of job vacancies” (p. 8). In September 
2003 unemployment stands officially at 5.8 per cent or some 627,000 unemployment 
beneficiaries (ABS, 2003; Anderson, 2003). However, “if underemployed, discouraged 
unemployed and disguised unemployed are taken into account the real level of 
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unemployment is in the order of 12 to 18% of the working age population" (Tomlinson, 
2003, p.1). Carlson and Mitchell (2002) calculated that Australia "now wastes over 12 
per cent of its available labour resources" (p.50). 
 
Successive Australian governments, and some overseas governments such as The 
Netherlands (Vanderborght, 2002) have sought to ‘disguise’ high unemployment 
numbers to some extent in the 1990’s by establishing artificial census data thresholds, 
such as classifying people as ‘employed’ if they worked for payment for one hour per 
week (ABS, 2001) and allowing relatively relaxed criteria enabling people to leave the 
unemployment benefit scheme in favour of the less demanding obligations and higher 
payments of the Disability Pension (DFACS, 2000; Odgers, 2002).  
 
Thus fewer people could be classified as unemployed (Vanstone, 2002a). However, in 
Australia the number of Disability Pension recipients now total over 650,000 people 
(Odgers, 2002) compared with the 627,000 who are receiving unemployment benefits 
(Anderson, 2003). This fact caught the Government’s attention, and new legislation has 
been introduced into Parliament (Vanstone, 2002a). The legislation is designed to 
remove eligibility for the Disability Pension from some people who have disabilities. 
Such people are to be placed into the Mutual Obligation unemployment program instead 
(Budget, 2002; Vanstone, 2003). The coercive, punitive nature of Mutual Obligation will 
be discussed shortly. Interestingly this legislation is currently blocked in the Senate on 
compassionate grounds (Senate Committee, 2002). 
 
Concerns are also publicly expressed periodically about the increasing numbers of 
people in receipt of the Aged Pension, and the possible non-viability, or future 
affordability of the Aged Pension scheme (Saunders & Tsumori, 2003; Vanstone, 2003). 
Thus, since the 1970’s the Australian income support system has increasingly had 
narrowed the basis of welfare payment eligibility. Such targeting has meant, “the 
Government is well on the way to restoring the conditionality of payment which makes 
welfare a charity rather than a right” (Castles, 2001, p.102).  
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Australia’s categorised and selective welfare system has become extraordinarily 
complex, which of itself raises fairness and equity issues. For example, the system does 
not subject blind people to means and assets tests or an activity test to qualify for the 
Disability Pension (Tomlinson, 2000; Ch.7, p.8), yet other people who have different 
disabilities are subject to means and assets tests.  
 
Sleep (2001) argued that because it is not ideologically acceptable that “deserving” 
welfare could apply to all people in need, Governments use selectivity and 
categorisation, and systems of blaming the ‘undeserving’, as methods for social control 
and welfare cost reduction. See also (Hammer, 2002). Ironically, similar justifications lay 
behind the construction of the British 1601 and 1834 Poor Laws (Polanyi, 1945; 
Stretton, 1996). 
 
The new ‘Working Poor’ 
A further complicating factor that warrants attention for background understanding, is 
the fact that in addition to having high unemployment and wasting labour resources, 
Australia is fast developing a new labour group known as the “Working Poor” 
(Strengmann-Kuhn, 2002). It is estimated that permanent full-time jobs now total less 
than half of all jobs. The ABS (2003) reports that as at August 2003 some 9.5 million 
people were working, 5.4 million of whom worked ‘full time at 35 hours or more’, leaving 
4.1 million working less than full time (43%). An ACTU survey (ACTU, 2003) and an 
“Age“ newspaper study (Age, 2003) report some 800,000 ‘full time’ jobs included in the 
ABS figure are ‘casual’. When the ABS statistic is adjusted to reflect this fact, 4.9 million 
jobs, or 51.5 per cent of all ‘jobs’ are now casualised, part-time and/or short-term, whilst 
only 48.5 percent of all jobs are permanent full-time (Schooneveldt, 2003). 
 
Even with full time casual work, individuals and working family members increasingly 
find that their low wages, high rates of income tax, unaffordable childcare services and 
an inability to qualify for and access long term housing loans has made them ‘the 
working poor’.  Increasingly people find themselves taking several part-time casualised 
jobs, working ever longer hours, but struggling to make ends meet or get ahead 
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financially (Harding & Szukalska, 2000). Individuals, who find themselves ‘churned’ from 
casualised employment into unemployment, because they are already poor, may need 
to become recipients of the unemployment benefit, for which they are then ‘blamed’ 
(Bryson, 1993, p. 464).  
 
Poverty traps 
One further group, often also ‘blamed’ for their own predicament include those 
Australians caught in “poverty traps”. Many families and individuals in receipt of income 
support from Government, including single parents, find themselves  “locked in” to the 
welfare system (Jackman, 1997; Standing, 2001). This is because such people, when 
they seek to earn additional income, find that they are penalised by higher taxation rates 
and the incremental loss of benefits which combined can exceed a staggering 100 per 
cent impost on the extra income earned, thus rendering the extra effort futile. 
 
Minister Abbott (2003) recently described some of the inequitable ‘poverty traps’ in the 
Australian Income support system.  He said "unfortunately, the interaction of the tax 
system and the welfare system means that people moving from unemployment to work 
generally face effective marginal tax rates of nearly 70 per cent and sometimes over 
100 per cent." Abbot identified families increasing weekly earnings from $285 to $585 
were actually only $ 29 per week better off (pp. 2-3).  He described this as an 
"inconvenient truth" that "Australia has a progressive tax system but a regressive 
personal income system through the interaction of tax and welfare for people with low 
and middle incomes". He concluded "It's very hard to see the fairness in a system, 
which works against people looking for jobs" (Abbot, 2003, p.4), yet he continues the 
rhetoric of vilifying and ‘blaming’ the ‘undeserving’ income support recipients (Honey, 
2002).  
 
  
From ‘blaming’ welfare recipients to ‘reciprocal obligation’ to Mutual Obligation 
This form of ‘blaming’ is well recognised (Titmuss 2000, pp.47-48; Watts 2001, p.5), 
because ‘blaming the victim allows policy makers to absolve themselves from 
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responsibility’ and obviates the need to provide full employment (Hartman 2001, pp. 3-
4). Windschuttle (1980) noted Labor Ministers in the 1970’s casting slurs about 
unemployed people being “work shy lion tamers and dole bludgers” (pp. 180-190), as 
the Hawke Labor Government set about introducing new activity tests based on the 
concept of ‘reciprocal obligation’. With the advent of the Howard Coalition Government 
in 1996, the stage was set for the imposition of Mutual Obligation.  
 
Mutual Obligation: 
(Giving something back to society in return for income support) 
 
In 1997 the Howard Government introduced the policy of Mutual Obligation. The policy 
is based on a traditional Lockean Protestant work ethic, that holds that one should not 
receive ‘something for nothing’. Indeed one ‘steals’ because without paying back, one is 
considered to be in “direct violation of the rightful, hard-earned property of others” 
(Schwarzenbach, 2002, p.1). Prime Minister Howard asserted that the Government 
should assist those [deserving poor] in genuine need. However, he also noted “it is the 
case that – to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so – those in receipt of such 
assistance should give something back to society in return, and in the process improve 
their own prospects for self-reliance” (Howard 1999, p.10).  
 
‘Self-reliance’ is an interesting concept. The complexities and equity of different asset 
and means tests for blind people and other people with disabilities were noted earlier. 
Means test incongruence also occurs when wealthy aged people have converted their 
major assets into one expensive luxury domestic residence. Such people would not 
trigger the value level under the means and assets tests because the personal 
residence is exempt, thus they would qualify for the Aged Pension and would not be 
required to ‘give something back’ or pay their own way (Centrelink, 1998). 
 
‘Giving something back’ to society is a compulsory obligation only for some targeted 
welfare recipients, but not others. Obligations could include specified volunteer work, 
approved study, participation in Work for the Dole programs or prescribed job-search 
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activities. Compulsory job-seeker diaries, interviews, Activity Tests and punitive 
‘breaching’ penalties for non-compliance were systems implemented to coerce some 
people into ‘giving something back’ (Moses & Sharples, 2000; Ziguras, Dufty, & 
Considine, 2003).  
 
Government Ministers readily portray many unemployed people as undeserving and 
deviant to justify coercion. It needs to be remembered that a third breach penalty 
aggregates to in excess of $3500, a penalty far in excess of many ‘criminal offense’ 
legal penalties (ACOSS, 2002; Bessant, 2000). Terms such as ‘dole bludgers’ (Abbott, 
2003; Brough, 2001), ‘unwilling to accept work’ (Vanstone, 2002a, 2002c) and ‘welfare 
dependant’ (Newman, 2000), are commonplace.  
 
However implementation of Mutual Obligation requirements has meant that unemployed 
people, (and soon single parents and people with disabilities), are now subjected to 
more surveillance, duties, and punitive measures than ever before. Unemployment 
payments are no longer a right but are ‘now made conditional upon participation in 
employment programs’ (Burgess, Mitchell, O’Brien & Watts, 2000, pp. 174-186). Such 
targeting has meant the Government “is well on the way to restoring the conditionality of 
payment which makes welfare a charity rather than a right” (Castles, 2001, p.102).  
 
Some general arguments underpinning Mutual Obligation 
The Social Security Amendment Bill, legalising the Mutual Obligation and Activity 
Requirements breaching regime, outlined that the main objective was ‘to maintain a 
strong deterrence for failure to meet reasonable requirements’ (Moses & Sharples 2000, 
p.4). This compulsory active job search requirement was expected to be acceptable to 
unemployed people as the ‘normal’ and ‘useful’ components of ‘reasonable’ job-seeker 
responsibilities (DEWRSB 2000; Newman 2000).  However, in a Brisbane survey of 
unemployed people who had been breached under Mutual Obligation, 73% of 
respondents, 41 out of 56 people, believed that they were not more likely to get paid 
work because of any Centrelink compulsory activity undertaken (Schooneveldt, 2002). 
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By consistently tightening its Mutual Obligation activity requirements and rules for 
payment suspensions and breach penalties (Atkins 2002; Pearce, Disney & Ridout 
2002) the Government apparently expected that one breach penalty or suspension 
would be sufficient to deter people from further non-compliance (DEWRSB 2001: 11). 
The majority of respondents to a Brisbane survey of unemployed people who had been 
breached for non-compliance of activity tests reported that getting breached was of no 
help to them in avoiding further breaches. 56% of respondents were breached more 
than once and 14% also had third time breaches (Schooneveldt, 2002, p. 69; ACOSS 
2001). 
 
Thus some understanding needs to be developed of what may be going wrong with the 
underlying assumptions justifying the use of categorical, targeted and coercive practices 
under the current Australian Mutual Obligation driven welfare distribution system. 
Arguably the system has been designed to provide income support only for citizens who 
need a “safety net” type of support, yet it accommodates some wealthy but undeserving 
individuals whilst refusing support to some of the most disadvantaged individuals that 
are in desperate need of support. 
 
An alternative concept: Unconditional Universal Basic Income support  
A Universal Basic Income (BI) is an unconditional cash payment to individual citizens 
sufficient to meet basic needs (UBINZ, 2003). Philippe Van Parijs (2000a), the doyen of 
the ‘Basic Income European Network (BIEN) wrote “A basic income is an income paid 
by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or 
work requirement” (p.3, italics in original). In its simplest form, Van Der Veen (1998) 
described Basic Income as a proposal “to disburse a tax-free subsistence income to 
every adult citizen, whether he or she is employed or unemployed, wealthy or poor, 
healthy or sick, active or idle, and…young or old, with basic incomes for children 
replacing existing child benefits” (p. 141).  
The idea of a Basic Income is not new. Van Trier (1995) noted that in 1920 Dennis 
Milner published what is believed to be the first British book on the idea of a Basic 
Income, which Milner called Minimum Income, and it was largely ignored. Milner (1920) 
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called for a minimum income to apply to all citizens, man, woman and child, without 
conditions or deductions (p.19) and his arguments, which he called ‘a business 
proposition’ are remarkably similar to those used today, eighty odd years later 
(Tomlinson, 2000). 
 
Professor Goodin (1992) argued that Basic Income support is a less presumptuous 
welfare distribution system than other forms of Government provided income support, 
because Basic Income is unconditional, thus there is no need for Government to pry on 
individuals to establish entitlement. There is no need for Government assumptions to be 
made as to the deserving or worthy status of the person receiving the payment. 
Tomlinson (2000) argued that Basic Income could alleviate income insecurity because it 
is an unconditional entitlement. The Government of Ireland recently produced a Green 
Paper on Basic Income, considering it to be feasible (DSCFA, 2002) in its deliberations 
toward implementation. Alaska has had a Basic Income distribution of its oil royalties, 
paid to all citizens, for the past 20 years (Bienfield, 2002, pp.10-13). 
 
 
Some compelling underpinning arguments for basic income 
Van Parijs (2000b) argues for the simplicity and power of a Basic Income system, as 
being appropriate for the 21st Century.  Baker (1992) makes an egalitarian case for 
Basic Income. Offe (1992) also noted the egalitarian aspect, the "it could be me" notion 
that one may need benefits oneself at some future time. However, ever-tightening 
targeting and categorisation which reduces eligibility for payment grants, at least in 
Australia, continues to be politically acceptable, regardless of the long established tenet 
of noblesse oblige, because “middle class well off people do not see the connection” 
between themselves and welfare recipients (p. 65).  
 
Noblesse Oblige is almost the opposite to the social phenomenon of ‘downward envy’. 
When governments actively name and blame welfare recipients for being a burden and 
a problem, it becomes easy for employed people to bemoan the ‘cost’ that is being 
expended through their taxes in support of undeserving welfare recipients. The 
 12
employed then come to envy less fortunate and unemployed people receiving the 
welfare pittance because they are perceived as ‘getting something for nothing’ 
(Tomlinson, 2003).  
 
Offe (1992) posed the obvious contra question against Basic Income, to illustrate this 
social perspective: "If 'you' are not engaged in gainful employment, and not even 
prepared to find and accept such employment once it is made available to you, why 
should 'we' be forced to subsidize your voluntary unemployment?" (p.74. italics in 
original). Standing (2001) believed that regressive fiscal policy stemming from 
globalisation eroded social solidarity, demonstrated by “the pressures of middle and 
upper income groups to stay above the lower class, evidencing ‘downward envy’ and 
growing numbers of “detached” people cut off from mainstream state benefits (pp.5-11).  
 
In supporting the concept of Basic Income, Standing (2001) argued strongly that all 
forms of work, not just paid work or labour were legitimate. "We must not let paternalists 
of any kind - Third Wayfarists, religious groups, Leninists, populists or whatever - to turn 
that right [the right to work] into a duty. If you focus only on labour, or paid work, other 
forms of work are more debased and their performers probably more oppressed, and 
one perpetuates an ethos of competitive individualism rather than one of what might be 
called social individualism based on recognition -and celebration- of mutual 
interdependencies" (p.32). 
 
Discussion:  A comparison of the ethical justifications used to promote a Basic 
Income with those of Australia’s selective Income Support system 
 
Various arguments have been discussed, both for and against unconditional Basic 
Income and the targeted, selective ‘mutually obligated’ Australian income support 
system. However, to consider and weigh up some ethical considerations about the two 
schemes, a brief ethical frame of reference will be established, to consider ‘Justice as 
fairness’ using John Rawls seminal 1971 “A theory of justice”. Rawls (1999 [2nd Ed.]) 
theorised that two conditions must apply before individuals can incur obligations to 
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government: Firstly, Society’s institutions must be just, and secondly individuals must 
have freely accepted the benefits provided by society (pp. 10-14). To be free to accept 
benefits, individuals must equally be capable of refusing them. Suffice here to note that 
Rawls (1999) believed “humankind has a moral nature” (p. 508).  
 
On the ascendancy of economic fundamentalism as a driver of governmental welfare 
systems and the ‘political economy’, Rawls (1999) noted “considerations of efficiency 
are but one basis of decision and often relatively minor at that”. He believed the 
“doctrine of political economy must include an interpretation of the public good which is 
based on a conception of justice” as fairness (p.229). Thus the task Rawls set himself 
was that of establishing what moral principles should govern the basic structure of a just 
and fair society: “what principles would be chosen by individuals from an impartial stand 
point, in order to establish arrangements which are both desirable and feasible?” 
(Kukathas & Pettit, 1990, p.36).   
 
Many writers have invoked Rawls in support of their arguments for and against both 
income support distribution systems under discussion. Kinnear (2000) examined Mutual 
Obligation for The Australia Institute, and found that ‘the ethical foundations of the 
Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation policies do not stand up to scrutiny’. One 
reason was that ‘Australia’s system of economic management [economic 
fudamentalism] has relied on creating joblessness to sustain economic growth’ which is 
unjust and against Rawls principle of “no harm” and the principle of “to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged” (p. V). (See Rawls; 1999, pp. 266-267).  
 
(Kinnear, 2000) argued further, that proponents of Mutual Obligation willingly impose 
activity requirements on unemployed people, in the belief ‘that unemployed people have 
some control over their joblessness, and therefore a choice to accept or reject welfare 
benefits’, however there is no realistic choice. Finding these two conditionalities not met, 
Kinnear (2000) declared that the Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation policies failed 
ethically and morally, which ‘may be a manifestation of moral decline’, because the 
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socially advantaged impose obligation as a form of repayment, upon the financially 
disadvantaged (pp.V-VI, italics in original). See also Hammer, (2002). 
 
Claus Offe (1992) argued for Basic Income from various non-productivist ethical 
standpoints. He rejected the notion of Mutual Obligation whereby "large numbers of 
welfare recipients should be 'blamed' for the condition they find themselves in". Nor 
should such people “be expected to accept the conditions they are in fatalistically” 
(p.62). The Rawlsian notions of “equal liberty for all…no one should tailor principles to 
suit their own case” fit this argument closely (Rawls, 1999, p.16). Such arguments 
remain cogent in the light of the Government’s current legislation before Parliament 
seeking to place people who have disabilities and single parents under Mutual 
Obligation as noted earlier (Anthony 2002).  
 
Also arguing against the coercive requirements of Mutual Obligation, Goodin (2001) 
invoked similar sentiment to the Rawlsian principle of ‘fair opportunity’ when he noted 
that lack of choice about receiving welfare, arguing that obliging people to sign 
contractual activity agreements in return for welfare benefits lacked moral force. The 
notion ‘agree or starve’ (by losing benefit payment) was analogous to the highway 
robber’s demand ‘your money or your life!’ (p. 191).  
 
In arguing for a Basic Income, Schwarzenbach (2002) argued against productive labour 
as the paradigm aspired to in modernist society as the “criterion for independence and 
‘full’ or ‘active’ citizenship”. In a similar non-productivist vein to Offe (1992) she 
promoted instead the notion that “reproductive labour”, not for the production of things 
but for “the maintenance and ‘reproduction’ of human relationships” has higher ethical 
value (pp.1-2). In support of her ethical claim, she invoked Aristotle: “relations of civic 
friendship between citizens are a necessary condition for genuine justice” (p.6). In 
support of justice, she invoked Rawls difference principle “whereby differences should 
work to better the disadvantaged” (p.5).  
Further aspects of Mutual Obligation that raise ethical questions as to justice as 
fairness: 
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In an international context, Tomlinson (2001, pp.10-11) argued that the Howard 
Government’s Mutual Obligation agenda is considered to breach Article 8(3)(a) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ‘No one shall be required to perform 
forced or compulsory labour’, which Australia has signed and ratified. (See also Burgess 
et al. 1998; p.17; Rees 2000; pp. 296-297). Ironically, the Howard Government’s 
coercion intended to reduce mythical ‘welfare dependency’ is demonstrably 
unnecessary. In a seminal international study conducted over ten years in The United 
States, Netherlands and Germany, Goodin, Heady, Muffels & Dirven (1999, pp. 136-
145) found an ‘exceedingly small percentage’ of people remained on welfare 
indefinitely, in any of those national welfare systems. Further, they found the rhetoric of 
‘welfare dependency’ referred to in those countries, and often heard in Australia, to be 
unfounded.  
 
Bessant (2000) asked a key question from an ethical perspective; "If policy-makers and 
politicians recognise that unemployment results from structural changes in the labour 
market and so on, why then insist that job seekers be forced to work for unemployment 
benefits?" (p.13). She went on to argue that Mutual Obligation ideology, especially as 
translated into the compulsory Work for the Dole program, denied rights of choice and 
freedom as to how to conduct one's own life. Further, she argued the decision to re-
define dole workers as ‘non-workers’ to avoid legally mandated employment terms and 
conditions actually violated “the human rights of jobless people"  (pp.14-15).  
 
Moving beyond well documented Rawlsian principles, Bessant (2000) warmed to her 
topic by citing The Australian Constitution (Paragraph xxiiiA, inserted 1946) noting "the 
move to compel unemployed people to work in return for income support constitutes a 
form of civil conscription which denies jobless people basic civil liberties”. She continued 
“in the same way the compulsory features of the [employment] program may also 
provide the basis for a complaint of discrimination to the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission" (p. 16).  
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Supporting Basic Income in ethical terms, Standing (2001) believed that income 
insecurity is against a citizen’s right, noting that poverty traps are immoral hazards 
whereby people find "unfair poverty traps [which] means that it pays to be dishonest" 
(p.20). He railed against the inefficiency of targeting, noting that "many policy makers 
seem more keen to prevent the 'undeserving' from receiving benefits than to make sure 
that all the 'deserving' do receive them" and concluded that "fiscal policy should not be a 
vehicle of social engineering" (pp. 25-31). This argument fits closely with the Rawlsian 
principle of reducing social and economic inequality “to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged…” (Rawls, 1999, pp. 266-267). 
 
Throughout history governments have sought to justify their actions by using the 
rhetoric of the righteous to claim ethical and moral behaviour. Current Australian 
Ministers demonstrate the ‘art’. Prime Minister Howard asserts Mutual Obligation activity 
will improve “prospects for self-reliance (Howard, 1999, p.6). Minister Newman used the 
term “tough love” to justify restricting eligibility for long term welfare beneficiaries in 
order to save them from “welfare dependence” and protect them from the “very severe 
stigma” that such people suffer (McKenna, 1999, p.11).  
 
Showing similar concern for welfare recipient wellbeing, Minister Anthony announced 
tightened Activity Test requirements for new Preparing for Work Agreements for the 
unemployed which would leave “people with a sense of pride and belonging…” 
(Anthony, 2000, p.1; Richardson, 2000). Minister Vanstone (2003) recently stated that 
she is being ‘kind and fair’ by stopping people who ‘harm themselves’ by getting 
handouts from Government (p.5). Minister Abbott, referring to current unemployment 
benefit levels, believes they represent “perverse incentives  [which] start to warp 
people’s best instincts” and so harm them (Abbott, 2003, p.4). Minister Brough delighted 
in reporting that tough measures against unemployment recipients are good, because 
they “flush out the dole cheats” (Odgers, 2001) implying that most unemployment 
beneficiaries cheat! 
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Summary  
To conclude this discussion, abundant authors criticise the developed world’s neo-
liberal economic fundamentalism and the increasingly globalised economy. On balance, 
when considered in the context of Rawls Theory of Justice as Fairness, there do appear 
to be more powerful arguments decrying the unfairness, and hence the lack of ethical 
underpinning, of the coercive and selective Australian income support distribution 
system. The arguments based on the unfairness, or ethical underpinning, against an 
unconditional Universal Basic Income system seem to have less resonance or power. 
 
Stilwell (1993) described the general complaint against economic fundamentalism, and 
by extension selective welfare succinctly: “So the triple goals of ecological sustainability, 
social justice and full employment cannot be guaranteed – indeed they are 
systematically violated” (p. 32). Stilwell continued with that view in his Political Economy 
(Stilwell, 2002). 
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